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Abstract
Financial intermediation serves a valuable purpose, but it can also be structured using equity modes of
financing. This can relieve the financee and increase diversity of entrepreneurial undertakings as in debt
based commercial financing, there is little room for diversity with obligatory and stipulated servicing of
debt. Using Islamic equity modes of financing poses the challenge of the agency problem and moral
hazard. The extent of this agency problem in Mudarabah and its impact on economic payoffs between
counterparties is analyzed in this study with a simulation model. Based on review of alternate solutions
proposed, the author presents two possible covenants which could make Mudarabah mode of financing
more acceptable and widely usable in financial intermediation. This would also further the egalitarian
objectives of an Islamic economic order.
Keywords: Interest free economy, Islamic Economic System, Mudarabah, Agency Problem, Moral
Hazard, Adverse Selection.
1. Introduction
Riba in Islamic Shariah refers to ‘Anything paid/charged over and above the principal amount on a loan’.
Allah in Quran said “Do not do wrong nor be wronged” (Al Baqarah: 279). It means that interest either
results in injustice to the borrower or sometimes, it could result in injustice to the lender. That is why,
lending or borrowing and taking or giving interest both are prohibited in Islam.
Furthermore, interest is prohibited due to its discouraging effects on enterprise. If one wants to invest
money to earn profit, Islam has allowed trade over lending for interest. If one does not want to invest
money for profit, but has some surplus funds, Islam has encouraged spending in charity over lending for
interest (Al Baqarah: 276).
Islamic Finance is a growing industry which is constantly evolving and has been competitive to reach and
sustain its growth momentum in the midst of even the Great Recession and beyond. Assets of the global
Islamic finance industry are estimated to grow to around $1.6 trillion by 2012 (Source: Reuters). Lately,
the Vatican said that banks should look at the rules of Islamic finance to restore confidence amongst their
clients at a time of global economic crisis. (Source: Osservatore, March 04, 2009). Some reports suggest
that assets held by Islamic financial institutions may rise five-fold to more than $5 trillion (Source: Moody’s
Investor Service).
But, Islamic finance industry mostly uses LIBOR linked financial contracts which are akin to debt financing
than the more preferable participatory modes of Mudarabah and Musharakah. Usmani (2003) describing
the less ideal nature of Murabaha with respect to contributing to the goals of socio-economic
redistribution in economy wrote:
“The instruments of leasing and Murabaha are sometimes criticized on the ground that their net result is
often the same as the net result of an interest-based borrowing. This criticism is justified to some extent,
and that is why, the Shariah supervisory Boards are unanimous on the point that they are not ideal modes
of financing and they should be used only in cases of need with full observation of the conditions
prescribed by Shariah.” (p. 13)
El-Gamal (2008) criticized current Islamic banking by stating that the primary emphasis in Islamic ﬁnance
is not on efficiency and fair pricing. Rather, the emphasis is on contract mechanics and certiﬁcation of
Islamicity by “Shariah Supervisory Boards”.
On the structural shortcomings in Islamic banking to avoid commercial risks, Warde (2000) criticized
Islamic finance on its inability to avoid 'Islamic moral hazard’; he defined it as unscrupulous behavior on
part of those engaged in Islamic finance.  This behavior is encouraged by certain features of  Islamic
finance including  the assumption  of  righteous behavior  on the part  of  employees and customers of
Islamic banks resulting in the use of  religion as a shield  against scrutiny.
2. Problem Statement
Islam prohibits interest, but the practiced Islamic finance contracts link cash flows with an interest based
benchmark; hence, there is a need to study whether the preferable equity mode of Mudarabah is usable
in Islamic finance and what contractual arrangements could be needed to make it usable.
3.        Objectives of the Study
The study sets forth following important objectives:
- To explore how far equity modes could be used in Islamic finance that are not only legal solutions
to the prohibition of Riba, but are also in line with Islamic egalitarian philosophy.
- To recommend contractual covenants to solve the principal agent problem and the problem of
moral hazard and adverse selection in Mudarabah financing.
4.        Importance of the Study
Islamic finance industry mostly uses LIBOR linked financial contracts which are based to debt financing
(dayn) than the more preferable participatory modes of Mudarabah and Musharakah. As per the current
orthodox understanding and practice of Islamic finance, the often quoted preferable modes like
Mudarabah and Musharakah are incapable even in a simple model economy with them as the only mode
of financing. Hence, there is a need to examine the reasons for their lack of use and to suggest important
changes in their features if the problem lies in contract mechanics.
5.        Scope of the Study
The study discusses the problems in preferable Islamic modes of Islamic finance and goes on to discuss
the alternate arrangements which could serve as need-fulfillment mechanisms in an Islamic economy.
6.        Limits of the Study
Since the preferable modes of Islamic Finance i.e. Musharakah and Mudarabah are not used by Islamic
Financial institutions (IFIs), empirical analysis of performance is not possible since they are rarely used.
However, since they are regarded as preferable modes by Islamic scholars and are well suited to Islamic
egalitarian philosophy, a study on how they can be applied is mandatory.
7.        Research Methodology
In this study, extensive literature review on Islamic economics has been done from books, monographs,
research articles and reports/bulletins. In discussing the efficacy of proposed changes in plain vanilla
equity modes of financing and contractual arrangements, an extensive use of economic theory and
analysis through scenario based models has been used to substantiate analysis. Simulation model is
used to explain the limitations in current structure of Mudarabah.
8. Critical Analysis of Mudarabah
Mudarabah is considered to be one of the most preferable modes of Islamic Finance both by earlier and
contemporary jurists and Islamic scholars. Ibn Taymiyyah observed: "One who deliberates on the basic
principles would easily conclude that Musaqat, Muzara’ah and Mudarabah are nearer to justice than hire."
(Fatawa, Vol.20. p.356).
Maulana Taqi Usmani (2004) in his book “Introduction to Islamic Finance” stated at least 5 times that
Mudarabah and Musharakah are ideal mode of financing respectively on page 12, 17, 72, 107 and 164.
His comments on Murabaha which is the most prevalent mode of financing also deserve serious thinking:
“It should never be overlooked that, originally, Murabaha is not a mode of financing. It is only a device to
escape from “interest” and not an ideal instrument for carrying out the real economic objectives of Islam.
Therefore, this instrument should be used as a transitory step taken in the process of the Islamization of
the economy, and its use should be restricted only to those cases where Mudarabah or Musharakah are
not practicable.” (p. 72)
Khan & Mirakhor (1987) commenting on the preferable nature of Mudarabah commented as follows:
“Even though in practice the role of profit-sharing and partnership is very small at present, they continue
to dominate the theory of' Islamic banking. They are regarded as the norms towards which practice
should and would, eventually gravitate.” (p.185-199).
One of the major hurdles in the use of Mudarabah on the asset side of a bank i.e. for financing is that only
Rabb-ul-Maal is considered to bear all the financial losses (Shaikh, 2010). Therefore, if an Islamic bank
enters into the Mudarabah contract as a Rabb-ul-Maal, only the Islamic bank would have to bear all the
losses. Mudarib (Fund manager) bears no loss while he has the complete authority in running the affairs
of the business. The Rabb-ul-maal (investor) is not allowed to participate in the affairs of the business (it
is unlike the case in VC funds where the Venture Capitalist could include several covenants for dealing
with agency problem and even select BoD and BoM and change them accordingly). When a loss occurs,
the Mudarib acts like an employee of the business and when the profit occurs, he shares in the profit as if
he was the only reason behind the profits.
Bacha (1997) highlighted serious agency problems in Mudarabah and argued that it lacks the bonding
effect of debt financing and can induce perverse incentives. Using scenario analysis, he showed that for a
‘borrower’ faced with the alternative of using Mudarabah, debt or equity financing, Mudarabah would be
best in a risk-return framework. For a financier faced with the same three alternatives however,
Mudarabah financing would be the worst. Likewise, Khalil et al. (n.d), Dar & Presley (2000), Warde (1999)
and Rosly & Zaini (2008) also highlighted the structurally chronic agency problem in Mudarabah.
State Bank of Pakistan in its report ‘Financial Stability Review for 2007-08’ commented on the issue in
following words:
“In fact, the agency problem is one of the major factors for the reluctance on the part of banks to
undertake equity based modes of financing, as it gives entrepreneurs the incentive to under‐state profits.”
(p. 7, Chapter 8)
To overcome agency problems, several researchers gave their solutions. Bacha (1997) proposed that the
Mudarib must ‘reimburse' the Rabb-ul-Maal in the event of certain outcomes. This reimbursement will be
in form of the Mudarib giving up part of his equity to the financier. Sarker (n.d) favored incentives for
honesty like providing stake in the ownership, linking transfer of ownership through granting bonus shares
on the performances, build reserve scheme to induce to hold company shares and provision for profit-
related pay linking with the declaration of profits etc. to reduce the agency problem. Central Bank of
Malaysia allowed tiered profit sharing structure in Mudarabah (Shariah Parameter Reference 3 for
Mudarabah, Bank Negara Malaysia).
Karim (2000) argued that agency problem could be resolved with Mudarib contributing some capital or
collateral in the project. Adnan & Muhammad (2008) argued that while cases of negligence of mudarib
leading to losses are taken care of in mudarabah, proper systems should evolve to establish such
negligence and ascribe the losses to the mudarib. Khan (2003) and Tegani (2003) suggested banks to
guarantee investment deposits by ‘Tabarru’ to minimize agency problem.
Now, we analyze these proposals and see how effective they could be in solving the agency problem in
Mudarabah. The proposal by Bacha (1997) is only applicable while the Mudarib is a corporation having its
own paid up capital. His proposal tries to solve the problem after it has occurred rather than preventing it
beforehand. Another possible problem with this proposal is the fact that market value of shares of the
Mudarib’s corporation could be anything at the time loss occurs in the joint venture of Mudarabah.
Sarker’s proposal is also focused on incentivizing than preventing the problem beforehand. It also fails to
solve the problem of adverse selection which requires a preventive measure than just incentives. Tier
wise profit sharing structure is not completely agreed upon by scholars worldwide.
The problem is in the disparity in payoffs if loss occurs in Mudarabah. In Mudarabah, to be willing to take
higher risk, the financier would demand higher returns reflected in demand for higher PSR (Profit Sharing
Ratio). But, with higher, PSR, the Mudarib’s motivation and incentive diminishes especially if the Mudarib
requires bearing no financial losses and already having means of sustenance with another business line.
Now, we present our analysis on the issue. The principle that loss sharing should be based upon and
limited to the amount of capital invested is not a condition mentioned in Quran or authentic Hadith. This
juristic viewpoint didn’t create much problem during early Islamic era when mostly the Mudarib was a poor
and resource-less person in financial need with limited incentive and authority to enter in corruption and
no capacity to participate in loss sharing if the loss was caused by any reason other than negligence on
his part. This could be appreciated by looking at the specific rules in Mudarabah highlighting the rights
and duties of Mudarib. Mostly, the Mudarib was a skillful, but a poor and resource-starved person in those
times.
In Musharakah, loss participation by all partners across the board is justifiable because all partners are
also allowed to work. But, due to the fact that in Mudarabah, the working partner is the sole authority to
do the business, making Rabb-ul-Maal completely responsible for sharing all losses is unjustified in the
first place.
Consider an Islamic economy with Mudarabah on asset and liability side and there is no other instrument
used, Mudarib (usually blue chip companies) with no liability to share loss can obtain financing from
banks who would be Rabb-ul-Maal in asset side use of Mudarabah. On liability side, bank will be Mudarib
and the small savers and investors will be Rabb-ul-Maal. So, any loss incurred by blue chip companies is
ultimately paid by small savers and investors who have all the liability to share losses without having a
say in the affairs of the business!
Restricted Mudarabah and clause of willful negligence is insufficient to protect them from losses strictly
due to business cycle fluctuations. This example shows that with current structure, even Mudarabah used
alone in an economy is insufficient to bring about any egalitarian change.
Let us analyze trust deficit and documentation problems which are cited as reasons why Mudarabah is
not being used widely. Relax these assumptions and now consider there is no trust deficit and
documentation problem in the economy. If a loss occurs due to business cycle fluctuations, no part of the
loss is borne by the business that had all the authority to run the business. The loss is borne not by the
bank as well because bank is Mudarib on liability side. All loss is borne by the small savers and investors.
Now consider the government prohibits interest based lending and borrowing too. Will the people want to
be Rabb-ul-Maal in Mudarabah with bank or the shareholder in a blue chip company which can take all
the money, invest it, earn from it and if loss occurs, pass it onto the small savers! Mudarabah (with current
structure) even when assumptions of trust deficit and documentation problems are relaxed and even
when there is no competing conventional banking system is ineffective to say the least.
Suppose there is a Company which has established itself with 100% equity investment of Rs
100,000,000. It faces three scenarios in the economy, i.e. Recession, Normal and Expansion. These
scenarios have a bearing on the Sales of the company. We assume that Cost of Goods Sold (CoGS) of
the Company is 60% of the Sales and its Operating Expenses (OE) are 60% of the Cost of Goods Sold.
The Balance Sheet and Income Statement of the Company is presented below. This particular project is
named as ‘A’. The company also has a plan to invest in another project which is named as ‘B’ in our
example. It has three ways to finance the project ‘B’. It could inject more equity, it could issue a bond at
10% rate of interest or it could contact an Islamic Bank and enter into a Mudarabah agreement as
Mudarib.
ROE is calculated as Net Profit (NP) divided by Equity multiplied by 100. Since we have not deducted
interest expense separately from Operating Expenses (OE), we deduct from NP (Net Profit) the interest
expense (Interest Based Liabilities x 10%) and then divide the result by Equity to obtain RoE when debt
financing is used.
Project A:Investment:100 Mln) Income Statement (Recession) Income Statement (Normal) Income Statement (Expansion)
Scenarios Particular Rs. Particular Rs. Particular Rs.
Phase Sales Sales 5,000,000 Sales 20,000,000 Sales 50,000,000
Recession 5,000,000 Less: CoGS 3,000,000 Less: CoGS 12,000,000 Less: CoGS 30,000,000
Normal 20,000,000 GP 2,000,000 GP 8,000,000 GP 20,000,000
Expansion 50,000,000 Less: OE 1,800,000 Less: OE 7,200,000 Less: OE 18,000,000
NP 200,000 NP 800,000 NP 2,000,000
Balance Sheet (100% Non-
Leveraged)
Balance Sheet (100% Non-
Leveraged)
Balance Sheet (100% Non-
Leveraged)
Total Assets 100,000,000 Total Assets 100,000,000 Total Assets 100,000,000
Liabilities - Liabilities - Liabilities -
Equity 100,000,000 Equity 100,000,000 Equity 100,000,000
RoE 0.20% RoE 0.80% RoE 2.00%
In the example below, first we assume that the Company incurs a loss in all scenarios on Project ‘B’. The
analysis will show the impact on ROE if the company incurs a loss. Project ‘B’ requires an investment of
Rs 25,000,000. We assume that Cost of Goods Sold (CoGS) of the Company is 60% of the Sales and its
Operating Expenses (OE) are 75% of the Cost of Goods Sold. The Consolidated Balance Sheet
(combining both projects) and Income Statement of the Company is presented below.
Project B (Investment: 25 Mln)
Scenarios Income Statement (Recession) - B Income Statement (Normal) - B Income Statement (Expansion)
– BPhase Sales Particular Rs. Particular Rs. Particular Rs.
Recession 1,000,000 Sales 1,000,000 Sales 4,000,000 Sales 10,000,000
Normal 4,000,000 Less: CoGS 600,000 Less: CoGS 2,400,000 Less: CoGS 6,000,000
Expansion 10,000,000 GP 400,000 GP 1,600,000 GP 4,000,000
Less: OE 450,000 Less: OE 1,800,000 Less: OE 4,500,000
NP (50,000) NP (200,000) NP (500,000)
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(100% Equity)
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(100% Equity)
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(100% Equity)
Project B Financed with Equity Total Assets 125,000,000 Total Assets 125,000,000 Total Assets 125,000,000
Liabilities - Liabilities - Liabilities -
Equity 125,000,000 Equity 125,000,000 Equity 125,000,000
RoE 0.12% RoE 0.48% RoE 1.20%
Consolidated Balance Sheet (80%
Equity)
Consolidated Balance Sheet (80%
Equity)
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(80% Equity)
Project B Financed with Debt at
10%
Total Assets 125,000,000 Total Assets 125,000,000 Total Assets 125,000,000
Liabilities 25,000,000 Liabilities 25,000,000 Liabilities 25,000,000
Equity 100,000,000 Equity 100,000,000 Equity 100,000,000
RoE -2.35% RoE -1.90% RoE -1.00%
Consolidated Balance Sheet (80%
Equity)
Consolidated Balance Sheet (80%
Equity)
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(80% Equity)
Project B Financed with
Mudarabah with PSR = 50%
Total Assets 125,000,000 Total Assets 125,000,000 Total Assets 125,000,000
Mudarabah
Investment
25,000,000 Mudarabah
Investment
25,000,000 Mudarabah
Investment
25,000,000
Equity 100,000,000 Equity 100,000,000 Equity 100,000,000
RoE 0.20% RoE 0.80% RoE 2.00%
It could be seen that RoE is higher in all scenarios (Recession, Normal and Expansion) if the company
finances project B with Mudarabah financing. Now, we consider what happens if there is a profit in Project
‘B’ in 3 scenarios i.e. Recession, Normal and Expansion. The example shows that the company will still
be having better ROE with Mudarabah if PSR is relatively high. The ROE in Mudarabah with high PSR is
comparatively better than ROE in the case when the company issues bonds and also when it issues
equity to finance project.
We assume that Cost of Goods Sold (CoGS) of the Company is 60% of the Sales and its Operating
Expenses (OE) are 60% of the Cost of Goods Sold. The Consolidated Balance Sheet (combining both
projects) and Income Statement of the Company is presented below.
Project B Investment: 25 mln
Scenarios
Income Statement (Recession) -
B Income Statement (Normal) - B
Income Statement
(Expansion) – B
Phase Sales Particular Rs. Particular Rs. Particular Rs.
Recession 1,250,000 Sales 1,250,000 Sales 2,500,000 Sales 25,000,000
Normal 2,500,000 Less: CoGS 750,000 Less: CoGS 1,500,000 Less: CoGS 15,000,000
Expansion 25,000,000 GP 500,000 GP 1,000,000 GP 10,000,000
Less: OE 450,000 Less: OE 900,000 Less: OE 9,000,000
NP 50,000 NP 100,000 NP 1,000,000
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(100% Equity)
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(100% Equity)
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(100% Equity)
Project B Financed with Equity
Total Assets 125,000,000 Total Assets 125,000,000 Total Assets 125,000,000
Liabilities - Liabilities - Liabilities -
Equity 125,000,000 Equity 125,000,000 Equity 125,000,000
RoE 0.20% RoE 0.72% RoE 2.40%
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(80% Equity)
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(80% Equity)
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(80% Equity)
Project B Financed with Debt
at 10%
Total Assets 125,000,000 Total Assets 125,000,000 Total Assets 125,000,000
Liabilities 25,000,000 Liabilities 25,000,000 Liabilities 25,000,000
Equity 100,000,000 Equity 100,000,000 Equity 100,000,000
RoE -2.25% RoE -1.60% RoE 0.50%
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(80% Equity)
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(80% Equity)
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(80% Equity)
Project B Financed with
Mudarabah
Total Assets 125,000,000 Total Assets 125,000,000 Total Assets 125,000,000
Mudarabah
Investment 25,000,000
Mudarabah
Investment 25,000,000
Mudarabah
Investment 25,000,000
Equity 100,000,000 Equity 100,000,000 Equity 100,000,000
RoE (PSR=5%) 0.203% RoE (PSR=5%) 0.805% RoE (PSR=5%) 2.050%
RoE (PSR=10%) 0.205% RoE (PSR=10%) 0.810% RoE (PSR=10%) 2.100%
RoE (PSR=20%) 0.210% RoE (PSR=20%) 0.820% RoE (PSR=20%) 2.200%
RoE (PSR=30%) 0.215% RoE (PSR=30%) 0.830% RoE (PSR=30%) 2.300%
RoE (PSR=40%) 0.220% RoE (PSR=40%) 0.840% RoE (PSR=40%) 2.400%
RoE (PSR=50%) 0.225% RoE (PSR=50%) 0.850% RoE (PSR=50%) 2.500%
RoE (PSR=60%) 0.2300% RoE (PSR=60%) 0.8600% RoE (PSR=60%) 2.6000%
RoE (PSR=70%) 0.2350% RoE (PSR=70%) 0.8700% RoE (PSR=70%) 2.7000%
RoE (PSR=80%) 0.2400% RoE (PSR=80%) 0.8800% RoE (PSR=80%) 2.8000%
RoE (PSR=90%) 0.2450% RoE (PSR=90%) 0.8900% RoE (PSR=90%) 2.9000%
The above example shows the condition of preference for the company about choosing a particular
financing method if it has profit.
Condition of Preference
Debt (Kd*TD)<(PSR*GP)
Mudarabah (Kd*TD)>(PSR*GP)
The Company will choose equity if it’s ROE with conventional equity financing is more than ROE in
Mudarabah financing. Its ROE will be more in conventional equity financing if PSR is lower. Hence, to be
encouraged to finance through Mudarabah, the Company will want higher PSR in Mudarabah.  Demand
for higher PSR which equates both ROEs could be beneficial for financee, but fruitless for the Islamic
Financial Institution since it will get smaller returns with unlimited and exclusive exposure to financial risk.
The problem of adverse selection necessitates a preventive mechanism than an incentive mechanism.
With important covenants in place, equity financing can be used and is used widely. It is interesting to
study the size of debt and equity market in developing countries. For instance, in Pakistan, corporate
bond market hardly exists, whereas equity financing is more prevalent and widely used. Equity financing
through shares will forever deny the claims of bankers in general and Islamic bankers in particular who
hide behind trust deficit and documentation problems. Why people invest in shares of companies without
any guarantee over par value let alone dividend?
In Mudarabah, following two covenants can be introduced.
a) Mudarib can be asked to contribute some capital. The contract will still remain different from
Musharakah as only the Mudarib is the working partner.
b) Mudarib can be asked to share in loss to some extent.
These two covenants will minimize the problem of adverse selection, moral hazard and principal-agent
conflict.
There is a famous Hadith in this regard which clearly states:
“All the conditions agreed upon by the Muslims are upheld, except a condition which allows what is
prohibited or prohibited which lawful.”
It may be argued that these two covenants may violate the principle of Al-kharaj bil Daman (Link of
exposure to risk i.e. one can claim profit only if one is ready to bear the business risk).
These covenants will not result in violation of the said principle because the proposal is not to transfer all
liability to the Mudarib and guarantee profit to the Rabb-ul-Maal. Rabb-ul-Maal will still be liable to bear
losses, but Mudarib by way of participation with some capital will also feature in loss sharing. It is unlike
the proposal by Khan (2003) and Tegani (2003) who suggested banks to guarantee investment deposits
by way of ‘Tabarru’.
To structure this model in compliance with principles of Islamic Fiqh, combination of Musharakah and
Mudarabah can be used whereby Mudarib in lieu of participation with capital will become a Sharik in the
combination. This combination is prevalent in offering liability products and is proposed by Maulana Taqi
Usmani (2004, p. 36) for project financing as well.
Infact, it is interesting to study whether the principle of Al-Khraj bil Dhaman and Al-Ghanum bil Gharam
(One is entitled to a gain only if one agrees to bear the responsibility for the loss) are violated in
Murabaha and all prevalent Islamic Finance contracts where unilateral undertaking which is binding as
well links two sales contracts or one sale and the lease contracts. Masri (2002) argued that unilateral
undertaking must be inadmissible in Sale and lease contracts wherein the unilateral undertaking is taken
by the bank before it has possession of the goods.
Islamic banks using Organized Tawarruq to a huge extent use their excess liquidity to provide funds to
the conventional banks who by way of this provide interest based loans to people. These suggested
covenants must be admissible if we are to move forward in entering the phase of Islamic Finance where
we could provide the benefits we once promised.
Conclusion
With important covenants in place, equity financing can be used and is used widely. It is interesting to
study the size of debt and equity market in developing countries. For instance, in Pakistan, corporate
bond market hardly exists, whereas equity financing is more prevalent and widely used. Equity financing
through shares defies the claims of bankers in general and Islamic bankers in particular who hide behind
trust deficit and documentation problems. Why people invest in shares of companies without any
guarantee over par value let alone dividend and even when the cash inflows are far from sight? Ironically,
Islamic values like justice, equality, truth, trust, kindness, honesty and responsibility are often discussed
in literature and seminars on Islamic Economics; whereas, in reality, the lack of these values in practice is
the major reason why preferable participatory modes remain unusable!
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